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Abstract
I study a single-agent sequential search problem as in Weitzman [13].
Contrary to Weitzman, conditional on stopping, the agent may take any
uninspected box without ﬁrst inspecting its contents. This introduces a
new trade-oﬀ. By taking a box without inspection, the agent saves on
its inspection costs. However, by inspecting it, he may discover that its
contents are lower than he anticipated. I identify suﬃcient conditions on
the parameters of the environment under which I characterize the optimal
policy. Both the order in which boxes are inspected and the stopping rule
may diﬀer from that in Weitzman’s model. Moreover, I provide additional
results that partially characterize the optimal policy when these conditions
fail.
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1 Introduction
Weitzman’s [13] model is used to study situations that ﬁt the following frame-
work: an agent has N boxes, each of which contains an unknown prize; he can
sequentially search for prizes at a cost, and search is with recall (see Olszewski
and Weber [10] and the references therein). Weitzman characterizes the optimal
search rule, which is deﬁned by an order in which boxes are inspected, and a stop-
ping rule: boxes are assigned reservation values; they are inspected in descending
order of their reservation values, and search stops when the maximum sampled
prize is greater than the maximum reservation value amongst uninspected boxes.
An assumption in Weitzman [13] is that the agent cannot take a box without ﬁrst
inspecting its contents. This assumption, which underlies the simplicity of the
optimal search rule, limits the scope of the model. I address Weitzman’s search
problem without this assumption. While Weitzman’s result can be understood as
an application of Gittins’ index for bandit problems, in my model, index policies
are not optimal (see Appendix S.1). Nevertheless, I ﬁnd suﬃcient conditions on
the parameters of the environment (the prize distributions and inspection costs)
under which the optimal policy can be fully characterized.
Before discussing the results in detail, and to illustrate the diﬃculties at hand,
consider the following example in which Weitzman’s assumption is unnatural (Sec-
tion 5 discusses two other applications). Suppose that the agent is a student who
has to choose from among the schools to which he has been admitted or not attend
school. He derives a utility of z from the latter option. The student has the option
of attending the visit day at each institution to determine how suitable a match
the school is. This requires eﬀort and time, which are costly to him. I interpret
each school as a box, how good a match the school is as the prize in the box,
attending the visit day as inspecting a box, and the eﬀort and time invested as the
box’s inspection cost. Weitzman’s assumption implies that the student can only
choose from schools at which he has attended the visit day.
I now use the example to show how the optimal policy changes in the absence
of Weitzman’s assumption. Assume that there are three schools, A, B, and C.
Below, I denote the value of attending school i P tA,B,Cu by xi. Each school’s
distribution over prizes is given in Table 1, based on an example by Postl [11]:
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A Prize 1 2 5











C Prize 0 1.5 10





Table 1: Prize distribution, inspection costs, and reservation values for each school2
In what follows, I consider three subproblems: the student has admission only
to school A (Problem 1), to A and B (Problem 2), or to all schools (Problem 3).
Problem 1. The student chooses between attending school A and not attending
school. In Weitzman’s model, if z ě 4, it is optimal not to attend school, while if
z ă 4, it is optimal to visit school A and then choose the best alternative. Note
that when z ă 1, he knows that attending school A is his best alternative, but
to do so, he must ﬁrst visit it. When he can choose to attend school A without
ﬁrst visiting it, the optimal policy coincides with Weitzman’s except that, when
z ď 2, he chooses to attend school A without ﬁrst visiting it. When z P p1, 2s, the
student chooses A despite the possibility that xA “ 1: in this case, information
about A is useful only when xA “ 1, and its expected beneﬁt (a payoﬀ increase of
1
4
pz ´ 1q) is smaller than its cost (1
4
). 
When the student can accept admission without attending the visit day, he stops
search more often than under the optimal policy in Weitzman’s model. This is
intuitive: conditional on stopping, he has more options available, meaning that
stopping has become more valuable. One might conjecture that, in general, this is
the only diﬀerence between the optimal policies in the two models. Problems 2 and
3 show that this is not the case: by making stopping more valuable, the option to
take a box without inspection changes the value of inspecting the diﬀerent boxes;
this, in turn, may make the optimal order diﬀerent from that in Weitzman’s model.
Problem 2. The student now has admission to A and B. Assume that z “ 0.
In Weitzman’s model, the optimal policy is as follows. School A is visited ﬁrst; if
xA “ 5, search stops; while if xA P t1, 2u, then school B is visited, and the student
2Table 1 aIso displays each school’s reservation value. I deﬁne the reservation value in Section
2.2 (see equation (RV)). However, the reader need not know this to be able to follow the example.
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chooses the best school. Had school B been visited ﬁrst, school A would always be
visited next: when xB “ 0, this is immediate; when xB “ 3, this follows because
the gain from visiting A, 1
4
p5 ´ 3q, is larger than the visit cost. Whether he visits
A or B ﬁrst, the student always chooses the best school; however, by visiting A
ﬁrst, he saves on the cost of visiting B when xA “ 5.
The option to attend a school without attending its visit day changes the optimal
policy because visiting school B ﬁrst becomes more attractive: after determining
that xB “ 0, the student can save on the inspection costs of school A (since
xA ą 0).3 Indeed, in the optimal policy, school B is visited ﬁrst; if the prize is
xB “ 0, then search stops, and school A is selected without inspection, while if the
prize is xB “ 3, the student visits school A and chooses the best school. Had school
A been visited ﬁrst, the optimal continuation coincides with that in Weitzman’s
policy because school B is too risky to accept without ﬁrst visiting it. 
When the student can accept admission without ﬁrst visiting a school, there
are (potentially) two countervailing eﬀects that, in this example, favor school B.
On the one hand, the solution to Weitzman’s problem suggests that, when both
schools are visited, it is better to visit A ﬁrst. Hence, when xB “ 3, and the
student visits school A next, he ‘regrets’ having visited B ﬁrst. On the other
hand, when xB “ 0, he is glad that he did not visit A ﬁrst; in this case, the
information obtained by visiting A is not useful. In a more general example, it
could be diﬃcult to determine how these two eﬀects (the cost of ﬁrst inspecting a
“dominated” school, B, and the beneﬁt of retaining the option to accept without
visiting a “dominating” one, A) compare.
Problem 2 shows that the option to take a box without inspection may make it
optimal to inspect boxes in a diﬀerent order than that in Weitzman [13]. One may
conjecture that, as in [13], there is a way to order the boxes at the outset such
that, as long as it is optimal to search, the highest uninspected box according to
this order is inspected next. Problem 3 shows that such an order may not exist:
the order in which schools are visited may depend on what is learned on the ﬁrst
visit.
Problem 3. Assume now that the student has admission to all schools and z “ 0.
3The example is stark for expositional purposes. For an example in which the same eﬀect
obtains and school A is not ex ante better than school B, see Appendix T.2.
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In Weitzman’s model, school C is visited ﬁrst, then A, and then B. However, in
the model considered here, the optimal policy is as follows. School C is visited
ﬁrst. If xC “ 10, search stops. If xC “ 1.5, schools are visited in Weitzman’s order:
in this case, acquiring the information from both A and B is valuable, and as in
Weitzman’s model, starting with A saves on visiting B when xA “ 5. However,
if xC “ 0, the optimal policy is as in Problem 2: when xC “ 0, the problem is
identical to Problem 2, and hence, visiting B ﬁrst is optimal. Thus, the order in
which schools are visited may depend on what the student has learned. 
1.1 Summary of results
Problems 1-3 show that, when the agent has the option to take a box without
inspection, the optimal policy loses the simplicity of the optimal policy in Weitz-
man’s model. In particular, as shown in Problem 3, the order may be history
dependent. As a consequence, depending on the realized prizes, the optimal pol-
icy may dictate that the same box is sometimes inspected while sometimes taken
without inspection. This, in general, makes the problem intractable. Recall Prob-
lem 2: after visiting school B, depending on xB, school A is visited or accepted
without visiting. For general distributions, and with more boxes, it is unclear how
the two countervailing eﬀects discussed compare.
Despite these diﬃculties, I identify suﬃcient conditions on the parameters of the
environment under which I characterize the optimal policy (see Theorems 1 and
2). Under these conditions, I show that the optimal policy satisﬁes the following
property: if a box is inspected with positive probability, then it is never taken
without inspection; similarly, if it is taken without inspection with positive prob-
ability, then it is never inspected. This property is key to avoiding some of the
diﬃculties illustrated in the example. As discussed in Section 4, these conditions
have been used elsewhere in the search literature to enable the characterization of
optimal search policies in environments where, without these assumptions, such
characterization has proved elusive.
Theorem 1 shows that if a condition on the pairwise payoﬀ comparison between
boxes holds, then Weitzman’s rule remains optimal. The condition holds, for exam-
ple, when boxes share the same inspection cost, and either (i) given any two boxes,
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the prize distribution of one box is obtained by a mean-preserving spread of the
prize distribution of the other (Proposition 4 and Corollary 1), or (ii) prizes normal-
ized by their means are drawn from the same symmetric distribution (Proposition
5). In contrast, Theorem 2 considers an interesting class of environments in which
the optimal policy does not coincide with Weitzman’s rule but nevertheless admits
a simple characterization. This class corresponds to the binary prizes environment
in Chade and Smith’s [3] simultaneous search model, in which boxes share the
same lower prize but may diﬀer in both the high prize and success probabilities.
Indeed, while their model is well suited to analyze the decision of which schools to
apply to, mine can be used to determine how to sequentially acquire information
on the schools to which the agent has been admitted.
1.2 Related Literature
This section discusses the closest related literature. In the main text, I discuss pa-
pers that apply assumptions similar to those of Theorems 1 and 2 to other search
problems and applications of the one-box case of the problem considered here.
Postl [11] postulates this search problem explicitly within the context of a principal-
agent model. He focuses on the two-box-equal-inspection-costs version of this
search problem and discusses an analogue of Proposition 4 in this simpliﬁed set-
ting. Proposition 4 in my paper generalizes his result and shows that it is not
necessary to assume two boxes or that the boxes have equal costs.
Klabjan, Olszewski and Wolinsky [7] study a search for attributes model in
which, contrary to my setting, the agent’s utility function is given by the sum
of the prizes (attributes). As in my setting, the agent does not have to inspect
all attributes to keep the object: he can accept the object, taking the rest of the
attributes without inspection. Under sequential search, and with two boxes, the
authors characterize the optimal solution when attribute distributions are sym-
metric around 0. The rule coincides with inspecting attributes in decreasing order
of their reservation values (see Proposition 5 for a similar result in this setup).
While Weitzman’s model corresponds to a multi-armed bandit problem, the one
considered here corresponds to a stoppable superprocess (Glazebrook [5]). Su-
perprocesses generalize bandit processes, in that at any point in time, the agent
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chooses a Markov decision process to continue and the control to apply to it. Index
policies are, in general, not optimal for these families. Glazebrook [5] provides a
suﬃcient condition under which index policies are optimal, but he does not char-
acterize the optimal policy absent this condition. His condition is too stringent for
the problem considered here and trivializes it (see Appendix S.1). My results con-
tribute to this literature by providing instances in which, despite an index rule not
being necessarily optimal, the optimal policy can still be characterized. Recently,
Ke and Villas-Boas [6] apply Glazebrook’s stoppable superprocesses model to a
two-box-binary-prize environment where, unlike my setting, the agent can only
obtain multiple noisy signals about the contents of a box by inspecting it. As in
my setting, the agent can choose to take a box without fully learning its contents.
Their model retains many of the features of that considered here: (i) index policies
are optimal when the outside option is suﬃciently high (see Proposition 1 for a
similar result in this setup) and (ii) the agent may prefer to ﬁrst inspect boxes with
low indexes. However, they do not provide a full characterization of the optimal
policy in their setting.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and solves
the one-box case. Section 3 derives three general properties of the optimal pol-
icy. These are central to the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2, which are introduced
in Section 4. The results in Sections 3 and 4 are stated informally to streamline
notation; the Appendix contains the formal statements. Section 5 concludes. All
proofs are in the Appendix. In the online Appendix, I show that no index rule is
optimal (Section S.1) and describe the optimal policy in the two-box case.
2 Model
An agent has a set N “ t1, ..., Nu of boxes, each containing a prize, xi, distributed
according to distribution function, Fi, with mean μip”
ş
xidFipxiqq. Box i has in-
spection cost ki. Fi and ki are known; however, xi is not. Prizes are independently
distributed, and for all i P N , ş |xi|dFipxiq ă `8. The agent has an initial outside
option, x0. Given a vector, z, I denote its highest coordinate by z. The agent
is risk neutral, and given a vector of realized prizes, z “ pz1, ..., znq, his utility
function is given by upzq “ z.
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2.1 Sampling Policy
The agent sequentially inspects boxes, and search is with recall. Given a set of
uninspected boxes, U , and a vector of realized sampled prizes, z, the agent decides
whether to stop or continue search; if he decides to continue search, he decides
which box to inspect next. Let ϕpU , zq P t0, 1u denote the decision to stop search
(ϕ “ 0) or to continue search (ϕ “ 1) at decision node pU , zq; if ϕpU , zq “ 1, let
σpU , zq P U denote the box that he inspects next. If ϕ “ 0, the agent chooses
between any prize in z and any uninspected box in U . If ϕ “ 1, he inspects box σ,
pays kσ, and observes its prize, xσ. Having observed xσ, the agent is now at decision
node pUztσu, z ˝ xσq, and selects ϕpUztσu, z ˝ xσq, and σpUztσu, z ˝ xσq, where for
a vector z “ pz1, ..., znq, z ˝ xσ “ pz1, ..., zn, xσq. Given a decision node pU , zq, the
strategy pϕ, σq, together with the distributions, tFiuiPU , determine a probability
distribution over continuation paths in the natural way, and the agent’s expected
payoﬀ at that decision node, which I denote by V pU , zq. I use stars to denote the
optimal strategies and the payoﬀ V when it results from using the optimal policy
in pU , zq.
At decision node pU , zq, the agent’s optimal strategy solves the following prob-
lem:
V ˚pU , zq “ maxtz,max
iPU μi,maxiPU ´ki `
ż
V ˚pUztiu, z ˝ xiqdFipxiqu.
2.2 One-box problem.
This section describes the optimal policy when N “ 1. Each box is now character-
ized by two cutoﬀ values: the reservation value, as in Weitzman [13], and a new
value, which I denote the backup value. When N “ 1, the reservation value, the
backup value, and the initial outside option determine the optimal policy. Sections
3-4 show that both values play an important role in determining the optimal policy
when N ą 1.
Denote the agent’s box by i and its expected value by μi. Let z denote the
value of the maximum sampled prize. The agent’s payoﬀ at decision node ptiu, zq
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is given by:
V ˚ptiu, zq “ maxtmaxtμpFiq, zu,´ki `
ż
maxtxi, zudFipxiqu
“ maxtμpFiq, zu ` maxt0,´ki `
ż
maxtxi, zudFipxiq ´ maxtμpFiq, zulooooooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooooooon
Ipzq
u,
where the second line is obtained by adding and subtracting maxtμpFiq, zu to
the ﬁrst. Ipzq represents the agent’s net increase in payoﬀ when he inspects box
i instead of taking his outside option, maxtμi, zu. That is, Ipzq represents the
value of information to the agent: whenever Ipzq ą ki, the agent inspects box i;
otherwise, he takes his outside option maxtμi, zu.
By analyzing Ipzq, it is possible to derive the shape of the optimal policy as a
function of z. Figure 1 below depicts Ipzq (this is the solid curve in the ﬁgure)
and the optimal policy when N “ 1. Since μi “
ş
xidFipxiq, Jensen’s inequality
implies Ipzq ě 0. In what follows, I ﬁrst provide intuition for the picture and then
show how to use it to solve for the optimal policy. I leave the formal analysis for













Figure 1: Optimal policy for N “ 1
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When z ě μi, Ipzq coincides with the downward sloping curve in Figure 1. In
this case, conditional on stopping, the agent takes z. However, by inspecting box
i, he may discover that box i has a better prize than z, increasing his payoﬀ by
xi ´ z. That is, when z ě μi, inspecting box i is valuable inasmuch as the agent
avoids discarding a box that contains a prize higher than his outside option. The
higher the value of z, the smaller the value that the agent assigns to inspecting
box i in this case, which explains why I is decreasing for z ě μi. It follows that
the agent does not ﬁnd it optimal to inspect box i for high enough values of z.
When z ă μi, Ipzq coincides with the upward sloping curve in Figure 1. In
this case, conditional on stopping, the agent takes box i without inspection. How-
ever, by inspecting box i he may discover that its prize is actually lower than z,
increasing his payoﬀ by z ´ xi. It is precisely the possibility of discovering that
xi ă z that makes inspecting box i valuable in this case. The lower the value of z,
the lower the value that the agent assigns to inspecting box i in this case, which
explains why I is increasing for z ă μi. It follows that the agent does not ﬁnd it
optimal to inspect box i for low enough values of z.
It follows that when z is too high or too low, it is not optimal to inspect box i.
This is intuitive: it is very unlikely that the information that the agent acquires
changes his choice (to keep z when it is high or take the contents of box i when z
is low), and since this information is costly, the agent would rather not acquire it.
Whether the agent inspects box i for intermediate values of z depends on the
value of ki. Since I is increasing below μi and decreasing above μi, when ki ě Ipμiq,
it is never optimal to inspect box i. However, when ki is as in Figure 1, the agent
ﬁnds it optimal to inspect box i for intermediate values of z. This is the interval
labeled pxBi , xRi q in Figure 1, whose endpoints are determined by the indiﬀerence
condition Ip¨q “ ki. These cutoﬀs are the main object of analysis in the section.
In what follows, I focus on the case when ki is in Figure 1 and formally deﬁne the
cutoﬀs. I then argue that focusing on this case is without loss of generality.
Consider ﬁrst the case z ě μi so that Ipzq “
ş`8
z
pxi ´ zqdFipxiq. Deﬁne the




pxi ´ xRi qdFipxiq, (RV)
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i.e., xRi is the value of the outside option that leaves the agent indiﬀerent between
inspecting box i and stopping and taking prize xRi . The agent inspects box i
whenever z ă xRi . Equation (RV) can be used to write the payoﬀ from inspecting

















This shows that the reservation value represents the highest prize that the agent
expects to obtain from inspecting box i, after internalizing inspection costs, as it
is as if the agent’s payoﬀ from inspecting box i is bounded above by xRi .
Consider now the case of z ă μi so that Ipzq “
şz
´8pz ´ xiqdFipxiq. Deﬁne the




pxBi ´ xiqdFipxiq, (BV)
i.e., xBi is the value of the outside option that leaves the agent indiﬀerent between
inspecting box i and taking it without inspection. The agent inspects box i if
xBi ă z; otherwise, he takes it without inspection. Equation (BV) can be written
as follows:


















Equation (2) illustrates that xBi is the lowest prize the agent expects to obtain
from box i when he takes it without inspection, after internalizing that he did not
pay box i’s inspection cost. I refer to xBi as box i’s backup value because, when
the agent takes box i without inspection, it is as if his payoﬀ is bounded below
by xBi .
Throughout, I make the following assumption, which is equivalent to requiring
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that ki is as in Figure 1 (i.e., x
B
i ă μi ă xRi ) for all i P N :4
Assumption 1. p@i P N qki ă
şμi
´8pμi ´ xiqdFipxiq “ Ipμiq.5
Remark 1. Appendix S.4 shows that if a box i P N violates Assumption 1, then
there exists an optimal policy in which it is never inspected. Therefore, in terms
of the agent’s optimal policy, a decision node pU , zq is identical to a decision node
pUBăR, z1q, where UBăR “ ti P U : xBi ă xRi u, and z1 “ z ˝
Ś
iRUBăR μi. Since the
results in Sections 3 and 4 hold for any vector of sampled prizes, z, Assumption 1
is without loss of generality. The only caveat is that, at decision node pU , zq with
UzUBăR ‰ H, the agent may ﬁnd it optimal to take box i P UzUBăR without
inspection, while at the corresponding decision node pUBăR, z1q, he would take z1.
Proposition 0 below summarizes the discussion in this section:
Proposition 0. Assume that N “ 1. Denote the agent’s box by i and his outside
option by z. The optimal policy, illustrated in Figure 1 above, is as follows:
1. If z ď xBi , the agent takes box i without inspection.
2. If xBi ă z ă xRi , the agent inspects box i and takes the larger prize between z
and the sampled prize, xi.
3. If xRi ď z, the agent does not inspect box i and takes his outside option.
Results similar to Proposition 0 have appeared in the one-box-settings of Chade
and Kovrijnykh [2] and Kra¨hmer and Strausz [8], in the two-box setting of Postl
[11], and in the attributes model of Klabjan, Olszewski and Wolinsky [7]. More-
over, the backup value plays a crucial role in the optimal mechanism of Ben-Porath,
Dekel and Lipman [1]. However, none of these papers provide a solution for the
search problem analyzed here.
3 Preliminary results for N ą 1
Section 3 presents three building blocks used for determining the optimal policy.
These are then used to prove the results in Section 4. Propositions 1 and 2 formalize
the claim that the backup value of box i represents the value of taking box i without
4Appendix T.3 illustrates Assumption 1 by means of an example.
5Note that μi in the expression deﬁning Assumption 1 is itself a function of Fi.
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inspection, while Proposition 3 provides a necessary condition for Weitzman’s order
not to be optimal. Moreover, Propositions 1-3 help to simplify the taxonomy of
the problem: when the conditions in Section 4 do not hold, should one attempt to
ﬁnd the solution by applying backward induction, the results in this section help
to narrow down the cases to be considered. This is illustrated in Section S.5 in the
online appendix, where I characterize the optimal policy when N “ 2. To state
the results, recall that U is the set of uninspected boxes and that μi “
ş
xdFi for
each i P U .
If, for all i P U , the maximum sampled prize, z, is greater than μi, from then
onward, the optimal sampling policy is given by applying Weitzman’s rule to the
boxes in U . Proposition 1 shows that, while suﬃcient, this is not necessary for
Weitzman’s rule to be optimal. Indeed, it states that whenever the maximum
sampled prize exceeds the highest backup value amongst the uninspected boxes,
the option of taking a box without inspection has no value to the agent. Hence,
Weitzman’s rule is optimal from that moment forward.
Proposition 1. Let pU , zq be a decision node such that, for all i P U , xBi ď z.
Then, Weitzman’s policy is optimal in all continuation histories.
Remark 2. The condition in Proposition 1 is not necessary for Weitzman’s policy
to be optimal. To see this, recall Problem 3. In that case, school A has the highest
backup value (xBA “ 2). However, when xC “ 1.5, Weitzman’s policy is optimal.
Suppose now that the agent is at a decision node pU , zq such that z ă maxiPU xBi .
Under Assumption 1, maxiPU xBi ă maxiPU μi. Thus, if the agent ﬁnds it optimal to
stop, he takes maxiPU μi.6 In particular, if he has only one box, then by Proposition
0, it is optimal to take it without inspection. When there is more than one box left
to inspect, Proposition 2 below provides necessary conditions for the optimality of
stopping and taking a box without inspection.7
Proposition 2. Let pU , zq be a decision node such that z ă maxiPU xBi . If it is
6Suppose that Assumption 1 did not hold. Instead of being at decision node pU , zq with
z ă maxiPU xBi , suppose that the agent is at decision node pU 1, z1q such that U “ U 1BăR , and
z “ z1 ˝ ˆiPU 1zU 1BăRμi, where U 1
BăR
is as in Remark 1. Then, the discussion in the main text
implies that it cannot be optimal to stop and take a box in U 1zU 1BăR without inspection.
7Remark S.2 in Appendix S.1 discusses the diﬃculties with obtaining a necessary and suﬃcient
condition.
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optimal to stop and take box m P U without inspection, then for all j ‰ m,
(i) μm ě xRj , and
(ii) xBm ě maxtμj, zu.
Thus, box m has the highest mean, reservation, and backup values amongst boxes
in U . By Assumption 1, m is the unique box in U with this property.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 follows from noting that the optimal stopping
policy trades-oﬀ decision accuracy and information acquisition costs. By contin-
uing search, the probability that the agent chooses the best alternative increases
(i.e., the accuracy of his decision improves), but this comes at the cost of inspect-
ing more boxes. Thus, if it is optimal to stop and take box m without inspection,
it has to be that the beneﬁt of improved decision accuracy is smaller than its cost.
There are two ways in which the agent could improve the accuracy of his decision.
First, he could check whether a box j ‰ m has a prize larger than μm. Second, he
could check whether the prize inside box m, xm, is actually worse than his second-
best outside option at pU , zq, maxtmaxj‰m μj, zu (since μm ą maxtmaxj‰m μj, zu).
When condition (i) fails, the agent prefers to check whether one of the uninspected
boxes has a prize better than μm than to take box m without inspection, thus in-
creasing the probability of concluding search having chosen the best alternative.
Similarly, when condition (ii) fails, the agent prefers to inspect box m to rule out
that it is worse than his other outside options, thus increasing the probability of
concluding search having chosen the right outside option. Thus, if it is optimal to
stop and take box m without inspection, conditions (i) and (ii) need to hold.
Remark 3. The conditions in Proposition 2 are only necessary for the optimality
of stopping and taking a box without inspection. To see this, recall Problem 2:
the conditions in Proposition 2 hold, but it is optimal to continue search.
The next result, Proposition 3, shows that there are two reasons that the agent
may deviate from Weitzman’s order when selecting which box to inspect next.
Given a decision node pU , zq, denote by l the box with the maximum reservation
value and by j ‰ l the box that is inspected at pU , zq according to the optimal
policy. Then, the agent expects that after inspecting j, he might either (i) take
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box l without inspection in Uztju or (ii) continue to search in Uztju but deviate
yet again from Weitzman’s order.
To understand (i), consider Problem 2 in Section 1. There, the agent inspects
school B (box j) ﬁrst, which is the one with the lowest reservation value. If, after
inspecting school B, the agent observes xB “ 0, then he accepts school A (box
l) without inspection. That is, the agent deviates from Weitzman’s order since
he assigns positive probability to accepting school A without inspection: had he
visited school A ﬁrst, he would have lost the option to do so.
To see that (ii) may happen, consider the following example; Section 4.2 discusses
the intuition behind it. Let U “ t1, 2, 3u, let Xi “ t0, xiu be the set of prizes, and
let pi “ P pXi “ xiq. Assume that x1 “ 7, x2 “ 8, x3 “ 9, p1 “ 34 , p2 “ 12 , p3 “ 27 ,
ki “ 1, and z “ 0. It can be checked that xR1 ą xR2 ą xR3 , xB1 ą xB2 ą xB3 . It
follows from Theorem 2 in Section 4 that the optimal policy inspects box 2 ﬁrst
and then box 3. Search stops when either xi is found or both boxes yield 0, in
which case, box 1 is taken without inspection. In this example, l “ 1, j “ 2, and
when Xj “ 0, the agent continues search (inspects box 3) but deviates once more
from Weitzman’s order (xR1 ą xR3 ), as in the last stage, box 1 is taken without
inspection.
Proposition 3. Let pU , zq be a decision node, l P U be the box with the highest
reservation value, and j P U be such that xRj ă xRl . If whenever maxtxj, zu ď xRl
it is optimal to inspect box l at decision node pUztju, z ˝ xjq, then it is not optimal
to inspect box j at pU , zq.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows. The only reason to inspect a
box other than that with the highest reservation value is to retain the option of
using the highest reservation value box as a backup. If the agent does not expect
to do this, but he expects to inspect at least one more box, it should then be the
highest reservation value box.
4 Optimal Policy: Order and Stopping
Section 4 presents suﬃcient conditions on the prize distributions and inspection
costs under which the optimal policy can be characterized. Under the suﬃcient
14
conditions in Section 4.1, the optimal policy coincides with Weitzman’s for all but
the last box. The conditions are expressed in terms of the pairwise payoﬀ compar-
ison between boxes; I also provide conditions on the primitives under which these
conditions hold. Section 4.2 considers the case in which boxes have binary prizes,
the lowest prize is common to all boxes, and boxes have equal inspection costs. In
this case, the optimal policy diﬀers from Weitzman’s in two ways. First, the agent
may take a box without inspection, even before reaching the last box. Second, the
agent may inspect next a box other than that with the highest reservation value.
In this case, the continuation policy follows from applying Weitzman’s solution to
an alternative search problem in which the highest reservation value box is not
available for inspection, but instead, the initial outside option coincides with the
mean of the highest reservation value box. That is, the agent continues search as
if the highest reservation value box is his outside option.
4.1 Suﬃcient conditions under which Weitzman’s policy is optimal
To state the conditions of Theorem 1, for any boxes i, j P N such that xRj ď xRi ,
consider the following alternative search problem. The agent only has boxes i, j
and no initial outside option. Then, his options are (i) inspect box i ﬁrst and
apply the optimal policy in Proposition 0 to box j, (ii) inspect box j ﬁrst and
apply the optimal policy in Proposition 0 to box i, and (iii) take box i without
inspection. Note that, by Proposition 2, it is never optimal to take box j without
inspection. Let Πij denote the payoﬀ of (i) and Πji the payoﬀ of (ii).
8 Theorem
1 requires that, in this alternative problem, it is always optimal to inspect box i
ﬁrst. That is, for any i, j such that xRj ď xRi , Πij ě maxtμi,Πjiu. Propositions 4
and 5 and Corollary 1 provide conditions on the model’s primitives under which
the conditions in Theorem 1 hold.
Theorem 1. Let N “ t1, ..., Nu be a set of boxes labelled such that xR1 ą ... ą xRN .
Assume that if i ă j, then Πij ě maxtΠji, μiu. The optimal policy is as follows:
Order If a box is to be inspected next, it should be the box with the highest reser-
8Πij is the payoﬀ from inspecting box i ﬁrst, and (i) if xi ě xRj , stop and take xi, (ii) if




1. If there is more than one box remaining, stop only if the maximum sampled
prize is higher than the highest reservation value amongst uninspected boxes,
and take the maximum sampled prize.
2. If only one box remains, stop if the maximum sampled prize is higher than
xR or lower than xB. In the ﬁrst case, take the maximum sampled prize;
otherwise, take the remaining box without inspection.
That the conditions in Theorem 1 are suﬃcient for the optimality of Weitzman’s
order and stopping policy for all but the last box follows from Propositions 2 and 3.
With two boxes left to inspect, the conditions in Theorem 1 can be used to show
that the box with the highest reservation value is to be inspected ﬁrst whenever
the maximum sampled prize is below its reservation value.9 Suppose now that
there are more than two boxes left to be inspected and that the maximum sam-
pled prize, z, is less than the highest reservation value amongst uninspected boxes,
xR1 . By Proposition 2, box 1 is the only candidate to be taken without inspection.
However, since Π12 ě μ1, and Π12 is a lower bound for the payoﬀ of continuing
search with box 1, then it cannot be optimal to take box 1 without inspection. To
see that box 1 should be inspected next, note that, according to the optimal policy,
if a box j ‰ 1 is inspected, then box 1 is inspected whenever maxtxj, zu ď xR1 . By
Proposition 3, this contradicts that inspecting box j is optimal.
The observation that, when there are two or more boxes left to inspect, the agent
only uses the highest reservation value box for inspection, and not to take without
inspection, is key to obtaining the optimality of Weitzman’s order. It allows us
to compare boxes 1 and j ‰ 1 solely on the basis of how desirable they are to
inspect. Without this, when inspecting a box j ‰ 1, depending on the realization
of xj, the agent may sometimes inspect box 1 and sometimes either take it without
inspection or inspect a box j1 ‰ 1. When one compares this to inspecting box 1,
there are two (possibly) countervailing eﬀects. On the one hand, box 1 is better
9The proof shows that, for any vector of previously sampled prizes, z, Πij provides a lower
bound to the payoﬀ from inspecting box i ﬁrst and applying the optimal policy to box j.
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for inspection than box j, and thus, whenever box 1 is inspected after inspecting
j, the agent could have improved his payoﬀ by reversing the order. On the other
hand, the remaining boxes after inspecting box 1 may not be as desirable to take
without inspection as box 1 is. Hence, by inspecting box j ﬁrst, the agent guar-
antees that his payoﬀ never falls below xB1 , whereas by inspecting box 1 ﬁrst, he
is exposed to a lower lower bound on his payoﬀ. Without additional structure on
the payoﬀs, it is not easy to discern how these eﬀects compare, especially since
they may depend very ﬁnely on the details of the optimal policy for the remaining
boxes.
Propositions 4 and 5 and Corollary 1 provide conditions under which the as-
sumptions in Theorem 1 hold. Proposition 4 requires that, given any two boxes
i, j, xRj ď xRi if, and only if, xBi ď xBj .10 Proposition 4 holds if, for example, given
any two boxes, the prize distribution of one box is obtained by a mean-preserving
spread of the prize distribution of the other, and all boxes share the same in-
spection cost (see Corollary 1). Proposition 5 considers the case in which prizes
normalized by their mean are distributed according to the same symmetric distri-
bution, and boxes share the same inspection cost. The three results are proved in
the online Appendix (Sections S.2-S.3).
Similar conditions have been used before in search models where, without these
assumptions, the full characterization of the optimal policy has proved elusive.
The same assumptions as in Corollary 1 are used by Vishwanath [12] to obtain
the reservation value rule in her parallel search model and in the working paper
version of Chade and Smith [3] to extend their binary-prize simultaneous search
model to one with a continuum of possible prizes. Similarly, Klabjan, Olszewski,
and Wolinksy [7] consider two boxes with symmetric distributions. The results
here, then, show that the usefulness of these conditions also extends to this envi-
ronment.
Proposition 4. Let N “ t1, ..., Nu be a set of boxes, and assume that whenever
i ă j, then rxBj , xRj s Ď rxBi , xRi s. Then, for all i, j P N such that i ă j, Πij ´Πji ą
0, and the optimal policy is as in Theorem 1.
10Postl [11] discusses an analogue of Proposition 4 in a two-boxes-equal-inspection-costs setup.
I show that the restriction to two boxes or equal inspection costs is not necessary and provide
conditions on the primitives of the model under which Proposition 4 holds.
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To see why Theorem 1 holds under the conditions in Proposition 4, note the
following. First, since the box with the highest reservation value is always the
box with the lowest backup value, Proposition 2 implies that, when there is more
than one box left to be inspected, it is never optimal to stop and take a box
without inspection. Second, from the proof of Theorem 1, it follows that when
rxBj , xRj s Ă rxBi , xRi s, Πij ě Πji. Intuitively, since the box with the highest xR is
the box with the lowest xB, by inspecting the highest reservation value box, the
agent never forgoes taking without inspection a good backup.
Corollary 1 shows conditions on the primitives such that the ordering of the
cutoﬀs is that in Proposition 4.
Corollary 1. Assume that tFiuiPN is such that if i ă j, then Fi is a mean-
preserving spread of Fj. Moreover, assume that @i P N ki “ k. Then, p@i, j P
N q, i ă j implies that rxBj , xRj s Ď rxBi , xRi s.
Corollary 1 has a simple interpretation. On the one hand, boxes with higher
dispersion are better for inspection since the agent can get better draws; on the
other hand, these boxes are not good backups since they can also contain worse
draws.
Remark 4. Figure 1 helps visualize Corollary 1. Note that the downward-sloping
curve in Figure 1,
ş`8
z
px ´ zqdFipxq, can be written as
ş




px´ zqdFipxq is the expectation of a convex function of x with respect
to Fi. Thus, if Fi is a mean-preserving spread of Fj,
ş
maxtx ´ z, 0udFipxq is
everywhere above
ş
maxtx´z, 0udFjpxq. If boxes i and j have the same inspection
cost, it follows that xRi ą xRj . The same holds for the backup value by noting thatşz
´8pz ´ xqdFipxq “
ş
maxtz ´ x, 0udFipxq, which is also convex. It follows that if
Fi is a mean-preserving spread of Fj and ki “ kj, then rxBj , xRj s Ď rxBi , xRi s.
Remark 5. It is worth noting that something weaker than mean-preserving spreads
is suﬃcient for Proposition 4 to hold when all boxes share the same inspection cost.
Indeed, it suﬃces that if i ă j, then, for all convex functions with non-negative





Proposition 5. Let N “ t1, ..., Nu be a set of boxes. Assume that Xi´μi „ F p¨q,
11Mean-preserving spreads, or the convex-order as it is deﬁned in Ganuza and Penalva [4] and
Li and Shi [9], requires the condition to hold for all convex functions.
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where F is symmetric around 0 and admits density function f . Assume further
that ki “ k. Label boxes such that μ1 ě ... ě μN .12 Then, the following hold:
1. For all i, j P N such that i ă j, Πij ´ Πji “ 0.
2. If μi ď xRj , or xBi ď μj, then the optimal policy is as in Theorem 1.
Proposition 5 follows because when boxes have symmetric distributions and equal
inspection costs, the (unconditional) expected value of the prizes above the reserva-
tion value in each box coincides with the negative of the (unconditional) expected
value of the prizes below the backup value in each box. Suppose that the agent
has two boxes, t1, 2u. Since μ1 ą μ2, then under the conditions of Proposition
5, xR1 ą xR2 and xB1 ą xB2 . When the agent compares the beneﬁts and the costs
of starting with box 1, he compares the upper tails of boxes 1 and 2 with their
lower tails: box 1 has a fatter upper tail and hence is better for search; box 2 has
a fatter lower tail, and hence, box 1 is better to take without inspection. Given
the above property, the costs and beneﬁts exactly oﬀset one another when z ă xB2 ,
and hence, box 2 is taken without inspection after starting with box 1 (recall that
the diﬀerence Π12 ´ Π21 is calculated at z ď min xBi ). When z ą xB2 , the beneﬁt
outweighs the cost because, in that case, z is a better buﬀer than the lower tail
of box 2, as captured by xB2 , when the prizes in both boxes are too low.
13 By
Proposition 2, item 2 in Proposition 5 implies that Πij “ Πji ě μi. Hence, the
optimal policy follows from Theorem 1.
4.2 Binary prizes
This section considers the optimal policy for the case in which, for all i P N ,
Xi “ ty, xiu, where y ă xi and pi “ P pXi “ xiq and ki “ k. Boxes are assumed
to satisfy these assumptions for the remainder of Section 4. This prize structure
coincides with that in Chade and Smith [3].14
12Recall that μi “
ş
xidFipxiq, i.e., Fi determines μi. In this case, Fipxiq “ F pxi ´ μiq, and
the assumptions on F imply that μi “
ş`8
´8 xidF pxi ´ μiq.
13Recall that, as discussed above, Π12 is a lower bound, for all z, of the payoﬀ from inspecting
box 1 ﬁrst.
14However, the cost structure is not as general as in their setting, as they allow for any convex
function that depends on the size of the set of boxes opened.
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The simpliﬁed payoﬀ structure allows me to characterize the optimal policy even
when the conditions of Theorem 1 fail. Theorem 2 shows that the optimal policy
in this case may diﬀer from that in Weitzman’s model in two ways. First, the
agent may stop and take a box without inspection even before reaching the last
box. Second, the agent may next inspect a box other than the highest reservation
value box. When this is the case, the continuation policy follows from applying
Weitzman’s solution to an alternative search problem where the highest reservation
value box is not available for inspection, but instead, the initial outside option
coincides with the mean of the highest reservation value box. That is, the agent
continues search as if the highest reservation value box is his outside option.
However, the optimal policy cannot be computed solely from the comparison of
the boxes’ backup and reservation values. In particular, the decisions of whether to
stop and take a box without inspection and of whether to deviate from Weitzman’s
order depend on the continuation values, which must be computed. This is an
inevitable consequence of the problem’s lack of indexability (see Appendix S.1).
Despite this, the analysis in this section is of interest for at least two reasons.
First, the simpliﬁed payoﬀ structure allows us to isolate cleanly a force behind
deviations from Weitzman’s order: the trade-oﬀ between concluding search sooner
and concluding search after having chosen the box with the highest x. This is
accomplished by identifying which boxes the agent inspects, when he does not
follow Weitzman’s order. Second, since the continuation values can be written
solely in terms of the boxes’ backup and reservation values, computing the optimal
policy for N boxes requires computing at most 4N numbers, which is a substantial
improvement over solving the problem by backward induction.
To simplify the exposition, and highlight separately the new ingredients of the
optimal policy, I now consider three special cases. I defer the general statement
and proof of Theorem 2 to Appendix A.3:
- Case 1 solves the two-box case, i.e., N “ t1, 2u, and calculates Π12,Π21. This
is suﬃcient to derive the conditions on the parameters under which Theorem
1 holds and Weitzman’s policy is optimal for all, except the last box.
- Case 2 introduces conditions under which the agent inspects boxes following
Weitzman’s order; however, he may stop and take a box without inspection
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before reaching the last box. In this case, the continuation values only de-
termine the decision of when to stop and take a box without inspection, not
the order in which the boxes are inspected.
- Case 3 introduces conditions under which the agent may deviate from Weitz-
man’s order; however, he does not take a box without inspection before
reaching the last box. In this case, the continuation values only determine
the decision of when to deviate from Weitzman’s order, not the stopping
rule.
Case 1 Let N “ t1, 2u, with xR1 ą xR2 . The payoﬀ from inspecting box 1 ﬁrst
and applying the optimal policy in Proposition 0 to box 2, Π12, is given by the
following:
Π12 “ ´k ` p1x1 ` p1 ´ p1qμ2.
After inspecting box 1, search stops. When box 1 has a prize of x1, search stops
because x1 ą xR1 ą xR2 . When box 1 has a prize of y, search stops because, by
taking box 2 without inspection, the agent is guaranteed to ﬁnd a prize of at least
y, while he saves on the inspection costs of box 2. Similarly, Π21 is given by the
following:
Π21 “ ´k ` p2maxtx2,´k ` p1maxtx1, x2u ` p1 ´ p1qx2u ` p1 ´ p2qμ1.
It is easy to see that when x2 ă xR1 , Π12 ą Π21: when he inspects box 1 ﬁrst, search
stops immediately, while it continues with positive probability when he inspects
box 2 ﬁrst. Consider now the case in which x2 ě xR1 . Then, the diﬀerence Π12´Π21
is given by the following:
Π12 ´ Π21 “ p1p2pxR1 ´ xR2 q ` p1 ´ p1qp1 ´ p2qpxB2 ´ xB1 q “ p1p2px1 ´ x2q. (3)
Hence, if it is optimal to inspect at least one box, the agent ﬁrst inspects the box
with the highest xi. Under both inspection orders, search stops after inspecting
the ﬁrst box. However, by ﬁrst inspecting the box with the highest xi, the agent
guarantees that he always concludes search having chosen the best available alter-
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native. Contrast this to the optimal policy in Weitzman’s model, where the agent
always ﬁnds it optimal to ﬁrst inspect box 1. When x2 ą x1, xR1 ą xR2 implies that
p1 ą p2. Thus, in Weitzman’s model, by inspecting box 1 ﬁrst, the agent saves on
inspection costs since search stops more often than when he inspects box 2 ﬁrst.
Suppose that x2 ą x1, meaning that, when search is optimal, the agent would
deviate from Weitzman’s order. Then, the agent inspects box 2 if, and only if,
Π21 ą μ1 ô xR2 ą μ1.
When x2 ě xR1 , the payoﬀ, Π21, is the same as the payoﬀ an agent who has box 2,
and an outside option of μ1 would obtain by inspecting box 2. It follows that box
2 is worth inspecting if its reservation value is higher than the outside option.
Remark 6. Theorem 2 shows that, when the agent deviates from Weitzman’s
order, he only inspects boxes with higher xi than the highest reservation value
box. These are stretch boxes: they have very high xis but low expected payoﬀs.
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By inspecting them ﬁrst, the agent avoids discarding them when they indeed have
a higher prize than the highest reservation value box.
Finally, assume that x1 ě x2. Then, Π12 ě Π21. Moreover, the agent inspects
box 1 if, and only if,
Π12 ą μ1 ô μ2 ą xB1 .
Note that Π12 is the same as the payoﬀ an agent who has box 1, and an outside
option of μ2 would obtain by inspecting box 1. It follows from Proposition 0 that
box 1 is worth inspecting if its backup value is less than the outside option.
It follows from the preceding discussion that if whenever xRi ě xRj , one has that
both xi ě xj and μj ě xBi , then Πij ě maxtΠji, μiu. Theorem 1 then implies that
the optimal policy coincides with Weitzman’s for all but the last box. Proposition
6 summarizes this:
Proposition 6. Fix a set N “ t1, ..., Nu of boxes that satisfy the assumptions of
Section 4.2. Assume further that if xRi ą xRj , then xi ě xj and μj ě xBi . Then,
15This nomenclature is from Chade and Smith [3]
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the optimal policy is as in Theorem 1.
In what follows, I consider cases in which the conditions of Proposition 6 do not
hold, and hence, it is not possible to guarantee that Weitzman’s policy is optimal.
Case 2 Assume now that the set N of boxes is labelled in decreasing order of
the xis and their reservation values, i.e., x1 ě ... ě xN and xR1 ą ... ą xRN , and
the initial outside option, x0, coincides with y. In contrast to Proposition 6, I no
longer assume that μj ě xBi for i ă j. Thus, when i, j are the only two boxes that
the agent has, it may be optimal for him to take box i without inspection.
In this case, it is optimal to inspect boxes according to Weitzman’s order. This
is intuitive: the only reason to inspect boxes with lower xis ﬁrst is that the agent
may save on inspection costs; however, this cannot be the case since, by construc-
tion, these are the boxes with lower reservation values.
However, it may be optimal for the agent to stop and take a box without in-
spection before reaching the last box. To see this, consider the extreme case in
which there is a box n such that xBn ě xRn`1. Under this assumption, when the
agent reaches box n, he should take box n without inspection: by deﬁnition, he
can never obtain more than xRn`1 from boxes tn` 1, ..., Nu (recall equations (RV)
and (2)), while by taking box n without inspection, his payoﬀ can never be less
than xBn . However, when x
B
n ă xRn`1, the decision of whether to inspect box n
or take it without inspection is less obvious: by taking box n without inspection,
he saves on the inspection costs of box n. However, he also forgoes continuing to
search boxes n ` 1, ..., N , which he may regret if box n has a prize of y.
To determine whether the agent stops and takes box n without inspection, it
is necessary to calculate the payoﬀ that the agent obtains by continuing search.
Since Weitzman’s order is optimal, the agent compares the value of taking box
n without inspection to the value of inspecting box n and proceeding optimally.
That is, he compares μn to ´k ` pnxn ` p1 ´ pnqvn, where vn is the payoﬀ of the
optimal policy at decision node ptn ` 1, ..., Nu, yq. Note that
μn “ μn ´ k ` k “ pnpxn ´ k
pn
q ` p1 ´ pnqpy ` k
1 ´ pn q “ pnx
R
n ` p1 ´ pnqxBn ,
´k ` pnxn ` p1 ´ pnqvn “ pnpxn ´ k
pn
q ` p1 ´ pnqvn “ pnxRn ` p1 ´ pnqvn,
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where the above equalities are obtained by applying the deﬁnition of the backup
and reservation values. The agent can always guarantee that he obtains the reser-
vation value of box n either by taking it without inspection or by inspecting it (re-
call equations (RV) and (2)). However, by inspecting box n, he obtains the value
of the option of continuing to search optimally at decision node ptn` 1, ..., Nu, yq
when the prize inside box n is y. Depending on how this compares to the backup
value, the agent decides to inspect box n or to take it without inspection.
Exploiting that the agent inspects boxes in decreasing order of their reservation
values, it is possible to construct inductively the values vn, from N to 1, as follows:
vN “ xBN , (4)
vn “ maxtxBn , pn`1xRn`1 ` p1 ´ pn`1qvn`1u.
Let n˚ “ minti P N : vi “ xBi u. Proposition 7 states the optimal policy in Case 2:
Proposition 7. Fix a set N “ t1, ..., Nu of boxes that satisfy the assumptions
of Section 4.2. Assume further that if xRi ą xRj , then xi ě xj. The optimal
policy is as follows. Boxes t1, ..., n˚ ´ 1u are inspected in decreasing order of their
reservation values. Search stops the ﬁrst time that prize xi, i ď n˚ ´ 1, is found
or when all inspected boxes yield a prize of y. In the latter case, box n˚ is taken
without inspection.
Case 3 Finally, assume that the set N of boxes is labelled in increasing order of
the xis and decreasing order of their reservation values, i.e., xN ą ... ą x1 and
xR1 ą ... ą xRN ; moreover, assume that xRN ą μ1. By construction, it follows that
μ1 ą ... ą μN . I continue to assume that x0 coincides with y.
The above assumptions imply that, when the agent has more than one box left
to be inspected, it is never optimal to take a box without inspection. By con-
struction, the smallest of the reservation values is larger than the maximum mean
value, which is in contradiction with item (i) in Proposition 2.
However, as in the two-box case, it may be optimal to deviate from Weitzman’s
order. By inspecting boxes in decreasing order of their reservation values, the
agent concludes search sooner: boxes with higher reservation values have higher
success probabilities, and search stops after observing xi. However, this comes at
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the cost that an uninspected box may have a higher xi.
If at some point the agent inspects a box other than the highest reservation
value box, it is never optimal to subsequently inspect the highest reservation value
box. The formal argument follows from applying Proposition 3; I focus here on
the intuition instead. As mentioned in Case 1, if two boxes, 1 and 2, are such that
x2 ą x1 and xR1 ą xR2 , then p1 ą p2. Thus, inspecting boxes in decreasing order
of their reservation value saves inspection costs: search stops when a prize of xi
is found, and this is more likely for box 1 than box 2. Thus, if the agent expects
that he will subsequently inspect the highest reservation value box, he should do
so immediately. In other words, if it were not for the possibility of saving on the
inspection costs of the highest reservation value box, the agent would not ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to inspect ﬁrst boxes with lower reservation values.
Since the agent never inspects the highest reservation value box after he devi-
ates from Weitzman’s order, it is as if the mean value of the highest reservation
value box is his new outside option. Since he never takes a box without inspection
before reaching the last box, it follows that the optimal policy has him inspect
the remaining boxes in decreasing order of their reservation values; he takes the
highest reservation value box without inspection if all of them have a prize of y.
As in Case 2, one needs to compute the continuation values to determine when
the agent deviates fromWeitzman’s order. As long as he has inspected the boxes in
decreasing order of their reservation values, the agent compares the payoﬀ from in-
specting box n next and continuing to search optimally or box n`1 and continuing
to search optimally. In the latter case, he obtains the payoﬀ from following Weitz-
man’s rule when the set of boxes is tn`1, ..., Nu and the outside option is μn, which
I denote by W ptn, n`1, ..., Nuq. I show in Appendix A.3 that W ptn, n`1, ..., Nuq
can be written solely in terms of txRn`1, ..., xRNu and txRn , xBn u.
Proposition 8 below summarizes the optimal policy in Case 3. To do so, given a
set N of boxes, deﬁne recursively from N ´ 1 to 1:16
vN´1 “ μN , (5)
vn “ maxtpn`1xRn`1 ` p1 ´ pn`1qvn`1,W ptn ` 1, ..., Nuqu.
16By assumption, the agent always inspects box N before N ´ 1.
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Deﬁne n˚ “ minti ď N ´ 1 : pixRi ` p1´ piqvi ă W pti, ..., Nuqu; the following then
holds:
Proposition 8. Fix a set of boxes N “ t1, ..., Nu such that xN ą ... ą x1 ą xR1 ą
... ą xRN ą μ1. The optimal policy is as follows. Boxes t1, ..., n˚ ´ 1, n˚ ` 1, ..., Nu
are inspected in decreasing order of the reservation values. Search stops the ﬁrst
time that prize xi, i ‰ n˚ is found or all inspected boxes yield a prize of y. In the
latter case, box n˚ is taken without inspection.
5 Conclusions
I consider a modiﬁed version of Weitzman’s model; namely, conditional on stop-
ping, the agent may take any uninspected box without ﬁrst inspecting its contents.
I identify suﬃcient conditions under which the optimal policy can be fully charac-
terized. These conditions have been used elsewhere in the search literature to en-
able the characterization of optimal search policies in environments where, without
these assumptions, such characterization has proved elusive. I also provide prop-
erties of the optimal policy that must hold across all environments (Propositions
1-3) and illustrate in Section S.5 how they can be used to reduce the taxonomy of
the problem when the suﬃcient conditions identiﬁed in Section 4 do not hold.
Identifying conditions under which the optimal policy admits a simple charac-
terization is useful for applications. Section 1 discusses one application of interest.
Two other applications of particular interest where the results could be applied to
are (i) the choice amongst technologies with which to produce a good when the
agent can invest in pre-project planning to determine the true production cost but
has the option to produce without making this investment (Kra¨hmer and Strausz
[8] consider a one-technology version of this problem) and (ii) the allocation of a
good to one of several agents when the principal can determine which agent would
generate the highest payoﬀ from obtaining the good but can allocate it without
further investigation, as in Ben-Porath, Dekel and Lipman [1].
A Proofs
In what follows, I use | ¨ | to denote the cardinality of a set.
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A.1 Proofs of Propositions 1, 2, and 3
Proposition 1. Let pU , zq be a decision node such that, for all i P U , xBi ď z.
Then Weitzman’s policy is optimal in all continuation histories.
Proof. The proof is by induction on U “ |U |. Let P pUq denote the following
predicate:
P(U): p@Uq : p|U | “ Uq, p@zq : pz ě maxiPU xBi q, the order and stopping policy
indicated in Proposition 1 is optimal.
Step 1: P p1q “ 1 This follows from Proposition 0.
Step 2: P pUq “ 1 ñ P pU ` 1q “ 1 .
Let U ` 1 “ |U |, and let z be as in the statement of Proposition 1. Let l P
argmaxiPU xRi . First, I show that the stopping rule is optimal. I consider two
cases:
z ě xRl : Note that if box i is inspected, by the inductive hypothesis, search
stops (since maxtz, xiu ě xR1 ). Thus, the payoﬀ from inspecting box i is ´ki `ş
maxtxi, zudFipxiq ă z. The last inequality follows from equation (RV).
z ă xRl : If maxtz,maxiPU μiu ‰ μl, then, by equation (RV), inspecting box l
and stopping dominates stopping and obtaining payoﬀ maxtz,maxiPU μiu, since
maxtz,maxiPU μiu ă xRl . If maxtz,maxiPU μiu “ μl, since z ě xBl , then
maxtz,maxiPUztlu μiu ě xBl , and hence, by equation (BV), inspecting box l and
stopping dominates stopping and taking box l without inspection.
Finally, when z ă xRl , I need to show that inspecting box l ﬁrst is optimal. Let
j P Uztlu be any other box. Note that xRj ă xRl . Consider the following two
policies:
P.J Inspect box j ﬁrst. There are now U boxes left to be inspected, stop, or
continue search according to the rule described in Proposition 1.
P.L Inspect box l ﬁrst. If xRl ď xl, stop. Otherwise, inspect box j, and stop, or
continue search according to the rule described in Proposition 1.
The payoﬀ from policies P.J and P.L can be written as:












V ˚pUztl, ju, z ˝ xj ˝ xlqdFlqdFj












V ˚pUztl, ju, z ˝ xj ˝ xlqdFlqdFj.
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The diﬀerence in payoﬀs between both policies is given by:
P.L ´ P.J “ p1 ´ FjpxRl qqr
ż `8
xRl




“ p1 ´ FlpxRl qqp1 ´ FjpxRl qqpxRl ´ xRj q `
ż xRl
xRj
pxj ´ xRj qdFj ě 0,
where the second equality follows from equation (RV) for boxes l, and j respec-
tively. Thus, inspecting box l dominates inspecting any other box j P Uztlu. This
completes the proof.
Proposition 2. Let pU , zq be a decision node such that, for some i P U , z ă xBi .
If it is optimal to stop and take box m P U without inspection, then for all j ‰ m:
(i) μm ě xRj ,
(ii) xBm ě maxtμj, zu.
Thus, box m has the highest mean, reservation and backup values amongst boxes
in U .
Proof. Suppose the agent is at decision node pU , zq and he ﬁnds it optimal to take
box m without inspection. Let j ‰ m. Suppose ﬁrst that xRj ą μm. The deﬁnition
of xRj would then imply that the agent prefers to inspect box j over stopping and
taking μm, a contradiction. Similarly, if maxtz, μju ą xBm, then the deﬁnition of
xBm would imply that the agent prefers to inspect box m, with maxtμj, zu as an
outside option, over stopping and taking μm.
Notice that since (i) holds for all j ‰ m, then it follows from Assumption 1 that
xRm ą μm ě maxj‰m xRj and μm ą xBm ě maxj‰m μj ą maxj‰m xBj . Then, m has
the highest mean, reservation, and backup value amongst all boxes in U .
Proposition 3. Let pU , zq denote the set of boxes, and the vector of realized
prizes. Assume that σ˚pU , zq “ j, where xRj ă maxiPU xRi ” xRl . Then, it cannot
be the case that for all xj such that maxtxj, zu ď xRl , ϕ˚pUztju, z ˝ xjq “ 1 and
σ˚pUztju, z ˝ xjq “ l.
Proof. Suppose σ˚pU , zq “ tju and the optimal continuation policy dictates in-
specting box l whenever maxtxj, zu ď xRl . The following policy improves on this,
as shown by the proof of Proposition 1: inspect box l ﬁrst. Whenever xRl ă xl,
stop. Otherwise, open box j and then proceed by using the prescribed policy when
U “ Uztl, ju.
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1. Let U denote a set of uninspected boxes, and let z denote the vector
of previously sampled prizes. Assume boxes are labelled so that xR1 ą ... ą xR|U |.
Assume that p@i, j P Uq such that i ă j, then Πij ´ Πji ě 0, and Πij ě μi. The
following is the optimal policy:
Order: σ˚pU , zq “ argminti : i P Uu.
Stopping:
1. If |U | ą 1, then ϕ˚pU , zq “ 0 if, and only if, z ě maxiPU xRi .
2. Otherwise, if |U | “ 1, then ϕ˚pU , zq “ 0 if, and only if, z ě maxiPU xRi or
z ď maxiPU xBi .
Proof. The proof is by induction on U “ |U |. Let P pUq denote the following
predicate:
P(U): p@zqp@Uq : |U | “ U , and U satisﬁes the assumptions of Theorem 1, the
order and stopping rules in Theorem 1 are optimal.
Proposition 0 shows that P p1q “ 1. I now establish that P p2q “ 1, and then prove
the inductive step.
Step 1: P p2q “ 1
Recall boxes are labelled so that xR1 ą xR2 . I show the optimality of the stopping
rule ﬁrst. Consider the following cases:
z ě xR1 : Note that if box i is inspected, by the inductive hypothesis, search
stops (since maxtz, xiu ě xRj ). Moreover, the payoﬀ from inspecting box i is
´ki `
ş
maxtz, xiudFipxiq ď z, where the inequality follows from equation (RV).
Therefore, when xR1 ď z, it is optimal to stop search.
z ă xR1 : It can never be optimal to stop and take z since, by equation (RV),
´k1 `
ş
maxtz, x1udF1px1q ą z. Moreover, Π12 ě maxtΠ21, μ1u implies that it
can never be optimal to stop and take box 1 without inspection. This proves the
optimality of the stopping rule.
Finally, it remains to show that inspecting box 1 ﬁrst is optimal whenever z ă xR1 .
If z ě maxiPU xBi , then this follows from Proposition 1. Hence, from now on,
assume that z ă maxiPU xBi . The payoﬀ from inspecting box 2 ﬁrst is:










whereas the payoﬀ from inspecting box 1, and proceeding optimally is given by:






maxtz ˝ x1, μ2,´k2 `
ż
maxtx1, x2, zudF2udF1.
Consider the following cases. First, suppose that xB2 “ maxiPU xBi . Similar steps
as in Section U show that,










pxB2 ´ z ˝ xB1 qdF2dF1,
which is positive. Hence, let’s assume that xB1 “ maxiPU xBi . Note that, then,












and Π2˚ “ Π21. Then, Π1˚ ´ Π2˚ ě Π12 ´ Π2˚ “ Π12 ´ Π21 ě 0.
This completes the proof that P p2q “ 1.
Step 2: P pUq “ 1 ñ P pU ` 1q “ 1.
Assume P pUq is true. Fix U as in P pU ` 1q. Note that, by assumption, box 1 is
the box with the highest reservation value.
The optimality of the stopping rule follows from the exact same steps in the proof
of P p2q “ 1. It remains to show that inspecting box 1 ﬁrst is optimal whenever
z ă xR1 . This follows from Proposition 3. Suppose that box j ‰ 1 is inspected
ﬁrst. By the inductive hypothesis, since |Uztju| ě 2, then box 1 is inspected
whenever maxtxj, zu ă xR1 . Proposition 3 establishes that, then, inspecting box 1
ﬁrst dominates inspecting ﬁrst box j ‰ 1.
A.3 Statement and proof of Theorem 2
I state and prove Theorem 2 which characterizes the optimal policy for the binary
prizes environment of Section 4.2. Recall that I am assuming that for all i P N ,
Xi “ ty, xiu, where y ă xi and pi “ P pXi “ xiq, and ki “ k.
In order to state the theorem, two additional pieces of notation are needed. First,
given a set U of boxes labelled in decreasing order of their reservation values, UD
is used to denote the set of boxes the agent inspects when he deviates from Weitz-
man’s order when boxes U are his uninspected boxes. The set UD is constructed
inductively as follows. Starting with i “ 2,UD “ H and moving through i “ |U |,
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if xi ď x1 or xRi ď μ1, set UD “ UD and i “ |U | ` 1; otherwise, set UD “ UD Y tiu
and i “ i` 1. UD collects the set of consecutive boxes in U that have xi ą x1 and
μ1 ď xRi . As discussed in Section 4.2, these are the only boxes the agent would
inspect, if he deviated from Weitzman’s order when his set of boxes is U . Second,








p1 ´ piqpjxRj `
ś
iPUD
p1 ´ piqpp1xR1 ` p1 ´ p1qxB1 q if UD ‰ H
´8 otherwise
.
Under the assumptions of Theorem 2, W pUDq represents the value of continuing
search by not following Weitzman’s order in U . It corresponds to the value in
Weitzman’s problem of inspecting boxes in UD, when the outside option is μ1.
Theorem 2. Fix a set N “ t1, ..., Nu of boxes. Assume that boxes have binary
prizes, Xi “ ty, xiu, where xi ą y, and pi “ P pXi “ xiq. Assume further that
ki “ k for all i P N . Label boxes so that xR1 ą ... ą xRN . Deﬁne inductively from
N to 1:
vN “ maxtx0, xBNu,
vn “ maxtxBn , pn`1maxtxRn`1, x0u ` p1 ´ pn`1qvn`1,W ptn ` 1, ..., NuDqu.
The following is the optimal policy. For n ě 1, say boxes t1, ..., n ´ 1u have been
inspected, and let z denote the maximum sampled prize.
Order: If a box is to be inspected next, the agent inspects box n if
pnx
R
n ` p1 ´ pnqvn ě W ptn, ..., NuDq, (A.1)
and box n` 1 otherwise. The latter can happen only if xBn “ maxiěn xBi , and
z ă xBn .
Stopping: Search stops if z ě xRn (in which case he takes z), or z ď xBn “
maxiěn xBi , tn, ..., NuD “ H, and xBn “ vn (in which case he takes box n
without inspection.).
For n ě 1, if W ptn, ..., NuDq ą pnxRn ` p1 ´ pnqvn, the agent continues search by
applying Weitzman’s rule to boxes in tn, ..., NuD, with outside option μn. That is,
he inspects boxes in tn, ..., NuD in decreasing order of their reservation values, and
search stops the ﬁrst time he ﬁnds a prize xi, or when he has inspected all boxes
in tn, ..., NuD, in which case he takes box n without inspection.
The proof of Theorem 2 is divided in three parts. First, I prove Lemmas A.1
and A.2. Second, I use the lemmas to show a modiﬁed version of Theorem 2. The
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third step constructs the indices tvnu, and completes the proof of Theorem 2. In
what follows, a decision node pU 1, z1q is said to be consistent with pU , zq, if U 1 Ă U ,
and z1 “ z ˝ z˜, for some z˜ P ŚjPUzU 1 Xj.
Suppose that at decision node pU , zq it is optimal to inspect box i P U next.
Lemma A.1 shows that, when prize xi obtains, it is never optimal to stop, and
take a box without inspection in the continuation. It follows that, conditional on
it being optimal to inspect box i, then Weitzman’s order is optimal conditional on
obtaining prize xi.
Lemma A.1. Let pU , zq be a decision node, where U satisﬁes the conditions in
Section 4.2. If σ˚pU , zq “ i P U , and ϕ˚pU , zq “ 1, then the following hold:
1. Conditional on stopping after Xi “ xi, the agent stops and takes xi with
positive probability.
2. For any decision node pU 1, z1q consistent with pUztσ˚pU , zqu, z ˝xσ˚pU ,zqq, and
reached with positive probability, if ϕ˚pU 1, z1q “ 0, then V ˚pU 1, z1q “ z1.
Proof. The proof is by induction on U “ |U |. Let P pUq denote the following
predicate:
P(U): p@zqp@Uq : |U | “ U , and U is as in Theorem 2, Lemma A.1 holds.
P(1)=1: This is immediate. Item 2 holds by construction. Moreover, the agent
only inspects the remaining box if he plans on taking the highest prize, in
case he gets it.
P(U)=1ñP(U+1)=1:
Assume P pUq is true. Fix U as in P pU ` 1q, and let 1 ” σ˚pU , zq. Note that
in order for this to be the case, it has to be that x1 ą z - otherwise, inspecting
σ˚pU , zq would be dominated. Moreover, note that any box i that is inspected
after decision node pUzt1u, z ˝ x1q has to satisfy xi ą x1.
It clearly has to be the case that 1. is true; otherwise, the agent could improve
his payoﬀ by skipping inspecting box 1. Let pU 1, z1q, with U 1 Ă pUzt1uq, and
z1 “ z ˝ x1 ˝ z˜ for some z˜ P ŚjPUzpU 1Yt1uqty, xju be the decision node at which
V ˚pU 1, z1q “ x1. Note, by the previous observation, that if U 1 is a strict subset of
Uzt1u, then it has to be that z˜ “ y.
Towards a contradiction, suppose that there exists pU2, z2q a decision node con-
sistent with pUzt1u, z ˝ x1q such that V ˚pU2, z2q “ maxiPU2 μi, and such that
pU2, z2q is reached with positive probability. Denote by i2 P U2 the box with
the highest mean in U2. Moreover, μi2 ą x1. Also, note that i2 R U 1; that is, box
i2 has already been inspected at decision node pU 1, z1q.
Let pU3, z3q be the last decision node that both pU 1, z1q, and pU2, z2q are con-
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sistent with. (That such a decision node exists follows from noting that both
pU 1, z1q and pU2, z2q are consistent with pUzt1u, z ˝ x1q.) Note that it has to be
that ϕ˚pU3, z3q “ 1, and σ˚pU3, z3q P U3zti2u. This holds because (i) pU 1, z1q,
and pU2, z2q are reached with positive probability under pσ˚, ϕ˚q, and (ii) box i2
remains uninspected at pU2, z2q.
Moreover, it has to be the case that pU 1, z1q is consistent with pU3ztσ˚pU3, z3qu, z3˝
yq, and pU2, z2q is consistent with pU3ztσ˚pU3, z3qu, z3 ˝xσ˚pU3,z3qq. The ﬁrst part
follows from the observation that the agent can’t have obtained a prize better than
y whenever he stops, and takes x1. The second part follows from pU3, z3q being
the last decision node that both pU 1, z1q and pU2, z2q are consistent with.
Then, at pU3, z3q it is optimal to inspect box σ˚pU3, z3q, and |U3| ă U ` 1.
Hence, by the inductive hypothesis, the probability of stopping and taking a box
without inspection after pU3ztσ˚pU3, z3qu, z3 ˝ xσ˚pU3,z3qq is 0, which contradicts
that the agent reaches pU2, z2q with positive probability from pUzt1u, z˝x1q. There-
fore, P pU ` 1q “ 1.
Suppose that at decision node pU , zq it is optimal to inspect a box σ˚pU , zq ‰
argmaxiPU xRi . Lemma A.2 shows that if it is optimal to continue search after
observing prize xσ˚pU ,zq, then, after observing prize y, it is not optimal to stop and
take the highest reservation value box without inspection.
Lemma A.2. Let pU , zq be a decision node. Suppose that ϕ˚pU , zq “ 1, and
σ˚pU , zq ‰ argmaxiPU xRi “ l. Then, if ϕ˚pUztσ˚pU , zqu, z ˝ xσ˚pU ,zqq “ 1, it can’t
be the case that V ˚pUztσ˚pU , zqu, z ˝ yq “ μl.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, suppose that the assumptions in the lemma hold,
and yet V ˚pUztσ˚pU , zqu, z ˝ yq “ μl. Then,
V ˚pU , zq “ ´k ` pσ˚pU ,zqp´k ` plxl ` p1 ´ plqV ˚pUztl, σ˚pU , zqu, z ˝ xσ˚pU ,zq ˝ yqq
` p1 ´ pσ˚pU ,zqqμl.
Note that the ﬁrst term in brackets in the ﬁrst line follows from Lemma A.1.
Consider the following policy, pσ˜, ϕ˜q. First, σ˜pU , zq “ l, and ϕ˜pUztlu, z ˝xlq “ 0.
For every node consistent with pUztlu, z˝yq, pU 1, z1q, such that V ˚pU 1zσ˚pU , zq, z1 ˝
xσ˚pU ,zqq ‰ xσ˚pU ,zq, let σ˜pU 1, z1q “ σ˚pU 1ztσ˚pU , zqu, z1 ˝ xσ˚pU ,zqq, and ϕ˜pU 1, z1q “
ϕ˚pU 1ztσ˚pU , zqu, z˝xσ˚pU ,zqq; otherwise, if V ˚pU 1ztσ˚pU , zqu, z1˝xσ˚pU ,zqq “ xσ˚pU ,zq,
let ϕ˜pU 1, z1q “ 0, and have the agent take box σ˚pU , zq without inspection.
Let V˜ pUztlu, z˝yq denote the payoﬀ of the above policy at decision node pUztlu, z˝
yq. Let p˚ denote the probability that the agent stops and takes xσ˚pU ,zq according
to policy pϕ˚, σ˚q starting from pUztσ˚pU , zq, lu, z ˝ xσ˚pU ,zq ˝ yq. Then, note that:
V˜ pUztlu, z ˝ yq “ V ˚pUztl, σ˚pU , zqu, z ˝ xσ˚pU ,zq ˝ yq ´ p˚p1 ´ pσ˚pU ,zqqpxσ˚pU ,zq ´ yq.
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Then,
V˜ pU , zq ´ V ˚pU , zq ě kpσ˚pU ,zq ´ p1 ´ plqp1 ´ pσ˚pU ,zqqy
` p1 ´ plqp1 ´ pσ˚pU ,zqqpV ˚pUztl, σ˚pU , zqu, z ˝ xσ˚pU ,zq ˝ yq ´ p˚pxσ˚pU ,zq ´ yqq
ě kpσ˚pU ,zq ` p1 ´ plqp1 ´ pσ˚pU ,zqqpV ˚pUztl, σ˚pU , zqu, z ˝ xσ˚pU ,zq ˝ yq ´ xσ˚pU ,zqq ą 0,
where the second to last inequality follows from p˚ ď 1, and xσ˚pU ,zq ą y, and
the last inequality follows from noting that V ˚pUztl, σ˚pU , zqu, z ˝ xσ˚pU ,zq ˝ yq ě
xσ˚pU ,zq.
The above contradicts the policy being optimal. Hence, the statement in the
lemma holds.
For the second part of the proof, I show the following modiﬁed version of Theo-
rem 2:
Theorem A.1. Fix a set U “ t1, ..., Uu of boxes as in Theorem 2. Label boxes so
that xR1 ą ... ą xRU . Then,
V ˚pU , zq “ maxtz, μ1, max
iPt1,2u
´k ` piV ˚pUztiu, z ˝ xiq ` p1 ´ piqV ˚pUztiu, z ˝ yqu.
(A.2)
Moreover, the following hold:
1. If z ě xR1 , search stops, and the agent takes z,
2. If z P rmaxiPU , xBi , xR1 q, search continues applying Weitzman’s rule,
3. If z ă maxiPU xBi ,
(a) If xB1 ă maxiPU xBi , inspect box 1; otherwise,
(b) If xB1 “ maxiPU xBi ,
i. If UD “ H, inspect box 1 if xB1 ă V ˚pUzt1u, z ˝ yq, and take box 1
without inspection otherwise, and
ii. if UD ‰ H, inspect box 1 if
p1x
R
1 ` p1 ´ p1qV ˚pUzt1u, z ˝ yq ě W pUDq,
and box 2 otherwise.
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Before proving Theorem A.1, note that, by Proposition 2, it holds that:
V ˚pU , zq “ maxtz, μ1,max
iPU ´k ` piV
˚pUztiu, z ˝ xiq ` p1 ´ piqV ˚pUztiu, z ˝ yqu,
(A.3)
since, for j ‰ 1, xR1 ą xRj ě μj implies that stopping and taking box j ‰ 1 without
inspection can never be optimal. Hence, in what follows, to prove that equation
(A.2) holds, it only remains to show that the max in the third argument on the
RHS of (A.3) can be taken only over i P t1, 2u.
Proof. The proof is by induction on U “ |U | ě 2. For U ě 2, let P pUq denote the
following statement:
P(U): p@pU , zqq such that U is as in Section 4.2, and |U | “ U , Theorem A.1 holds.
I start by showing that P(2)=1.
P(2)=1:
Given the observation before the proof of Proposition A.1, equation (A.2) holds
trivially. Moreover, if z ě xR1 , then by the inductive hypothesis, the payoﬀ from
inspecting box i and proceeding optimally is ´k ` pixi ` p1 ´ piqz ď z.
The rest of the proof follows from equations (3), and the discussion in Case 1 in
Section 4.2, by noting that when xR1 ą xR2 , and x2 ą x1, then xB1 ą xB2 . Therefore,
P p2q “ 1. I now prove the inductive step.
P(U)=1ñP(U+1)=1 Suppose that P pUq is true. Let pU , zq be as in P pU ` 1q.
I start by showing that if z ě xR1 , then search stops. By the inductive hypothesis,
the payoﬀ of inspecting any box i with xi ą z is given by: ´k ` pixi ` p1´ piqz ď
z.Therefore, search stops, and item 1 holds. Moreover, in that case, equation (A.2)
holds because the max on the right hand side is achieved by taking z. From now
on, assume that z ď xR1 .
Proposition 1 implies item 2 holds. Moreover, in that case, (A.2) also holds
since the max on the right hand side is achieved by continuing search with box 1.
From now on, then, assume that z ă maxiPU xBi . Note that since z ă xR1 , then
V ˚pU , zq ą z.
In what follows, I show that equation (A.2) holds when z ă maxiPU xBi . Note
that if V ˚pU , zq “ μ1, then the result follows trivially. Hence, assume that:
V ˚pU , zq “ max
iPU ´k ` piV
˚pUztiu, z ˝ xiq ` p1 ´ piqV ˚pUztiu, z ˝ yq,
and, towards a contradiction, assume that this max is not attained at i P t1, 2u.
Let j denote the maximizer in the above expression. Note that, for this to be the
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case, it has to be that z ă xj. Since |Uztju| “ U , the inductive hypothesis implies
V ˚pUztju, z ˝ xjq, V ˚pUztju, z ˝ yq can be written as:
V ˚pUztju, z ˝ xjq “ maxtxj, μ1, max
iPt1,2u
´k ` Ex˜iV ˚pUztj, iu, z ˝ xj ˝ x˜iqu,
V ˚pUztju, z ˝ yq “ maxtz ˝ y, μ1, max
iPt1,2u
´k ` Ex˜iV ˚pUzti, ju, z ˝ y ˝ x˜iqu.
Moreover, Lemma A.1 implies Weitzman’s rule is optimal after observing xj.
Hence,
V ˚pUztju, z ˝ xjq “ maxtxj,´k ` p1maxtx1, xju ` p1 ´ p1qV ˚pUzt1, ju, z ˝ xj ˝ yqu.
Finally, Lemma A.2 implies that if:
V ˚pUztju, z ˝ xjq “ ´k ` p1maxtx1, xju ` p1 ´ p1qV ˚pUzt1, ju, z ˝ xj ˝ yq,
then
V ˚pUztju, z ˝ yq ‰ μ1.
In what follows, I consider cases for V ˚pUztju, z ˝ xjq (indexed with upper case
roman numbers), and V ˚pUztju, z ˝ yq (indexed with lower case roman numbers).
I. V ˚pUztju, z ˝ xjq “ xj (i.e. xj ě xR1 ), and
(i) V ˚pUztju, z ˝ yq “ μ1. Note that this cannot be. That search with j is
optimal at pU , zq implies that μ1 ă xRj pă xR2 q. Hence, ´k`p2x2 `p1´p2qμ1 ą μ1,
contradicting V ˚pUztju, z ˝ yq “ μ1.
(ii) V ˚pUztju, z ˝ yq “ ´k ` p1x1 ` p1´ p1qV ˚pUztj, 1u, z ˝ y ˝ yq. Proposition
3 implies that this is dominated by inspecting box 1 ﬁrst.
(iii) V ˚pUztju, z ˝yq “ ´k`p2V ˚pUztj, 2u, z ˝y ˝x2q`p1´p2qV ˚pUztj, 2u, z ˝
y ˝yq. By the inductive hypothesis, this can only be the case if x2 ą x1, and hence
V ˚pUztj, 2u, z ˝ y ˝ x2q “ x2.17 Note that xR2 ą xRj implies that this is dominated
by the policy that (i) inspects box 2 ﬁrst, (ii) if the prize is x2, stops and takes x2,
(iii) if the prize is y, inspects box j, and proceeds optimally from there on.
II. V ˚pUztju, z ˝xjq “ ´k`p1x1`p1´p1qV ˚pUztj, 1u, z ˝xj ˝yq (i.e., xj ď xR1 q,
and
(i) V ˚pUztju, z ˝ yq “ ´k ` p1x1 ` p1 ´ p1qV ˚pUztj, 1u, z ˝ y ˝ yq. Proposition
3 implies that inspecting box j is dominated by inspecting box 1 ﬁrst.
(ii) V ˚pUztju, z ˝ yq “ ´k ` p2x2 ` p1 ´ p2qV ˚pUztj, 2u, z ˝ y ˝ yq.18 By the
17It has to be that z ă x2 since it was optimal to inspect box 2.
18I applied the inductive hypothesis to calculate V ˚pUztj, 2u, z ˝ y ˝ x2q, since by P pUq the
agent can only switch, and inspect box 2 when x2 ą x1pą xR1 q.
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inductive hypothesis, it follows that:

























p1 ´ plqpixRi `
ź
lPpUzt2uqD
p1 ´ plqμ1 ” W ppUzt2uqDq, (A.4)
whenever pUzt2uqD ‰ H, and
V ˚pUztj, 2u, z ˝ y ˝ yq “ μ1,
otherwise. To see this, note that |Uztju| “ U , and hence the inductive hypothesis
states that if it is optimal to inspect box 2 ﬁrst, then the agent continues search by
applying Weitzman’s rule to boxes in pUzt2uqD “ pUzt2, juqD, with outside option
μ1. Equation (A.4) shows that this has value W ppUzt2uqDq. To show that, in case
(ii), inspecting j is suboptimal, consider the following policy, P.1: the agent
inspects box 1 ﬁrst. If the prize is x1, he stops. If the prize is y, he inspects box j.
If the prize is xj, he follows the optimal policy from that point on; otherwise, he
inspects boxes in pUzt2uqD, and takes box 2 without inspection if all such boxes
yield a prize of y (or, if pUzt2uqD “ H). The payoﬀ from P.1 is:
P.1 “ ´k ` p1x1 ` p1 ´ p1qp´k ` pjV ˚pUztj, 1u, z ˝ xj ˝ yqq
` p1 ´ p1qp1 ´ pjqrW ppUzt2uqDq `
ź
iPpUzt2uqD
p1 ´ piqpμ2 ´ μ1qs.
The diﬀerence P.1 ´ V ˚pU , zq is given by:




´ p2p1 ´ pjqx2p1 ´ p1 ´ p1q
ź
iPpUzt2uqD












iPpUzt2uqDp1´piq “ 1, I rewrite the above
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as:
P.1 ´ V ˚pU , zq “ kp1 ` p1 ´ pjq
ź
iPpUzt2uqD
p1 ´ piqp1p2px1 ´ x2q





p1 ´ plqpipp1pxR1 ´ xRi q ´ p2pxR2 ´ xRi qq
“ p1 ´ pjq
ź
iPpUzt2uqD









p1 ´ plqpipp1pxR1 ´ xRi q ´ p2pxR2 ´ xRi qq




Notice that x2 ą x1, and xR1 ą xR2 implies that p1 ą p2; likewise, for any box










p1 ´ plqpipp1 ´ p2qpxR2 ´ xRi q
ą 0.
Hence, P.1´V ˚pU , zq ą 0. This contradicts that inspecting box j ﬁrst is optimal.
This concludes the proof that equation (A.2) must hold.
To prove 3a and 3(b)i, I now show that if either xB1 ‰ maxiPU xBi (so that the
condition in 3a holds), or x2 ď x1 (so that UD “ H), then inspecting box 1 ﬁrst
dominates inspecting box 2 ﬁrst. Once I do this, Proposition 2, then, implies
that 3a holds; in that case, box 1 does not have the highest backup value, and
hence, it can’t be optimal to stop, and take it without inspection. Suppose ﬁrst
that x2 ď x1. Denote by P.2 the payoﬀ from inspecting box 2 ﬁrst. Apply the
inductive hypothesis to conclude that:
P.2 “ ´k ` p2pmaxtx2,´k ` p1x1 ` p1 ´ p1qV ˚pUzt1, 2u, z ˝ x2 ˝ yquq
` p1 ´ p2qV ˚pUzt2u, z ˝ yq.
Assume ﬁrst that x2 ă xR1 . Then, by the inductive hypothesis, the max in the ﬁrst
line of the above expression is achieved at ´k`p1x1`p1´p1qV ˚pUzt1, 2u, z˝x2˝yq.
Notice that, by repeating the same steps as in item II. above with box 2 taking
the place of box j, inspecting box 1 ﬁrst dominates inspecting box 2 ﬁrst.
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Then, assume xR1 ď x2 ď x1. Then,
P.2 “ ´k ` p2x2 ` p1 ´ p2qV ˚pUzt2u, z ˝ yq.
Consider the following cases for V ˚pUzt2u, z ˝ yq, labelled in upper case letters:









In that case, consider the policy, P.1 which inspects box 1 ﬁrst, then boxes in
pUzt2uqD, and if all contain a prize of y, takes box 2 without inspection. The
diﬀerence P.1 ´ P.2 is given by:









p1 ´ plqpipp1pxR1 ´ xRi q ´ p2pxR2 ´ xRi qq.
Notice that p1 ą pi, and p2 ą pi for all i P pUzt2uqD. If p1 ą p2, by using that
xR1 ´ xRi ą xR2 ´ xRi , it follows that P.1 ´ P.2 ą 0. Otherwise, note the following.
First,
pipp1pxR1 ´ xRi q ´ p2pxR2 ´ xRi qq “ pip1px1 ´ xiq ` pip2pxi ´ x2q ` kpp1 ´ p2q.
Second,
p1pipx1 ´ xiq ą kppi ´ p1q “ ´kpp1 ´ piq ą ´x2p2p1 ´ p2qpp1 ´ piq
“ ´p2x2pp1 ´ piq ` p22x2pp1 ´ piq
“ ´p2x2pp1 ´ piq ` p22x2pp1 ´ piq ` pp2 ´ p1qx2p2p1 ´ p2q
´ pp2 ´ p1qp2p1 ´ p2qx2 ą p2pipx2 ´ xiq ` kpp2 ´ p1q,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from xR1 ą xR2 , the second inequality follows from
xR2 ą xB2 ñ p2p1 ´ p2qx2 ą k, and the last inequality follows from p2pp1 ´ piq ą
pp2 ´ p1qp1 ´ p2q, p2p1 ´ p2qx2 ą k, and xi ą p2x2.
Hence, P.1 ´ P.2 ą 0, and this contradicts inspecting box 2 being optimal.
B. V ˚pUzt2u, z ˝ yq “ μ1. Consider the policy P.1 that inspects box 1 ﬁrst, if
the prize is x1 it stops, and if the prize is y, it takes box 2 without inspection. In
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that case:
P.1 ´ P.2 “ p1p2px1 ´ x2q ě 0.
Hence, inspecting box 2 ﬁrst cannot be optimal.
C. V ˚pUzt2u, z ˝ yq “ ´k` p1x1 ` p1´ p1qV ˚pUzt2, 1u, z ˝ y ˝ yq. By Proposition
3 in the paper, this is dominated by inspecting box 1 ﬁrst, and then following the
optimal policy in the continuation.
Finally, assume that x2 ą x1, and xB1 ă maxiPU xBi . Note that x2 ą x1, and
xR1 ą xR2 implies p1 ą p2, and hence xB1 ą xB2 . Hence, maxiPU xBi ą xB2 . Moreover,
note that for any i P UD, the same holds. By the inductive hypothesis, the payoﬀ
of inspecting box 2 ﬁrst is given by:
P.2 “ ´k ` p2x2 ` p1 ´ p2qp´k ` p1x1 ` p1 ´ p1qV ˚pUzt1, 2u, z ˝ y ˝ yq.
To see this, note that x2 ą x1 ą xR1 , and hence the agent stops when he obtains
prize x2. Moreover, box 1 is not the highest backup value box in Uzt2u, and hence,
by the inductive hypothesis, it is inspected next. Proposition 3 implies that the
payoﬀ from inspecting box 1 ﬁrst dominates P.2. This also proves item 3a.
To ﬁnish the proof of item 3(b)i,19 note that when UD “ H, it can’t be optimal
to inspect box 2 next. Hence, search stops if:
´k ` p1x1 ` p1 ´ p1qV ˚pUzt1u, z ˝ yq ď μ1 ô V ˚pUzt1u, z ˝ yq ď xB1 .
Finally, to show 3(b)ii, note that if UD ‰ H, then inspecting i P UD, and stopping
and taking box 1 without inspection if x˜i “ y, dominates taking box 1 without
inspection. Hence, it cannot be the case that V ˚pU , zq “ μ1. Moreover, as in
equation (A.4), the value of continuing search with box 2 is W pUDq, whereas the
value of continuing search with box 1 is:
´k ` p1x1 ` p1 ´ p1qV ˚pUzt1u, z ˝ yq “ p1xR1 ` p1 ´ p1qV ˚pUzt1u, z ˝ yq.
The comparison between these two values yields that item 3(b)ii holds.
The ﬁnal step follows from the proof of the following claim:
Claim A.1 (Stopping rule for Theorem 2). Fix a set U “ t1, ..., Uu of boxes as
19I already showed that if x2 ď x1, then it is better to continue search with box 1. Suppose
that x2 ą x1, and μ1 ą xR2 . Then, applying the inductive hypothesis the payoﬀ from inspecting
box 2 ﬁrst is: ´k ` p2x2 ` p1 ´ p2qmaxtμ1,´k ` p1x1 ` p1 ´ p1qV ˚pUzt1, 2u, z ˝ y ˝ yqu. If the
second max is achieved at μ1, since x
R
2 ď μ1, this is dominated by μ1; otherwise, Proposition 3
implies the payoﬀ from inspecting box 1 ﬁrst dominates.
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in Theorem 2, and let z denote the initial outside option. Then, for n ď U ´ 1,
V ˚pUzt1, ..., nu, z ˝ y ˝ ... ˝ ylooomooon
n
q “ maxtW ppUzt1, ..., nuqDq, pn`1maxtz ˝ y, xRn`1u ` p1 ´ pn`1qvn`1u,
vU “ maxtz ˝ y, xBUu.
Proof. I prove it for n “ U ´ 1, and then extend it inductively for n ă U ´ 1.
Suppose that n “ U ´ 1. I need to show that:
V ˚pUzt1, ..., U ´ 1u, z ˝ y ˝ ... ˝ ylooomooon
U´1
q “ pU maxtz ˝ y, xRUu ` p1 ´ pUqmaxtz ˝ y, xBUu,
since pUzt1, ..., U ´ 1uqD “ H. Consider the following cases:
I. If z ˝ y ě xRU , then, by Theorem A.1, box U is not inspected. Hence,
V ˚pUzt1, ..., U ´ 1u, z ˝ y ˝ ... ˝ yq “ z ˝ y.
II. If z ˝ y P pxBU , xRUq, then by Theorem A.1, box U is inspected, and the agent
keeps the best prize between what is in box U and z ˝ y. Then, V ˚pUzt1, ..., U ´
1u, z ˝ y ˝ ... ˝ yq “ ´k ` pUxU ` p1 ´ pUqz ˝ y “ pUxRU ` p1 ´ pUqz ˝ y.
III. If z ˝ y ď xBU , then the agent takes box U without inspection. Hence,
V ˚pUzt1, ..., U ´ 1u, z ˝ y ˝ ... ˝ yq “ μU “ ´k ` k ` pUxU ` p1 ´ pUqy “ pUxRU `
p1 ´ pUqxBU .
This completes the proof for n “ U´1. Suppose the claim is true for all n1 ą n. I
show that: V ˚pUzt1, ..., nu, z˝y ˝ ... ˝ ylooomooon
n
q “ maxtW ppUzt1, ..., nuqDq, pn`1maxtz ˝ y, xRn`1u`
p1 ´ pn`1qvn`1u. Consider the following cases:
I. If z ˝ y ą xRn`1, then by Theorem A.1, box n ` 1 is not inspected, and
hence V ˚pUzt1, ..., nu, z ˝ y ˝ ... ˝ yq “ z ˝ y. Note that since z ˝ y ą xRn`1 “
maxiPUzt1...nu xRi , then z ˝ y ą W ppUzt1, ..., nuqDq, and for n1 ą n, vn1 “ z ˝ y.
II.If z ˝ y P pmaxiPUzt1,...,nu xBi , xRn`1q, or z ˝ y ă maxiPUzt1,...,nu xBi ‰ xBn`1, then
by Theorem A.1, box n ` 1 is inspected, and hence:
V ˚pUzt1, ..., nu, z ˝ y... ˝ yq “ ´k ` pn`1xn`1 ` p1 ´ pn`1qvn`1
“ pn`1xRn`1 ` p1 ´ pn`1qvn`1.
III. If z ˝ y ă xBn`1 ” maxiPUzt1,...,nu xBi , consider the following cases:
(i) pUzt1, ..., nuqD ‰ H, and pn`1xRn`1 ` p1 ´ pn`1qvn`1 ě W ppUzt1, ..., nuqDq,
then by Theorem A.1, box n`1 is inspected, and one obtains the desired expression
for V ˚pUzt1, ..., nu, z ˝ y ˝ ... ˝ yq.
(ii) pUzt1, ..., nuqD ‰ H, and pn`1xRn`1 ` p1 ´ pn`1qvn`1 ă W ppUzt1, ..., nuqDq.
By Theorem A.1, boxes in pUzt1, ..., nuqD are inspected according to Weitzman’s
order, with outside option μn`1. As shown, this has value W ppUzt1, ..., nuqDq, and
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hence V ˚pUzt1, ..., nu, z ˝ y... ˝ yq “ W ppUzt1, ..., nuqDq.
(iii) pUzt1, ..., nuqD “ H, and vn`1 ą xBn`1, then box n ` 1 is inspected, and
the desired expression obtains.
(iv) Finally, suppose that pUzt1, ..., nuqD “ H, and vn`1 “ xBn`1. Then, box
n ` 1 is taken without inspection, and V ˚pUzt1, ..., nu, z ˝ y ˝ ... ˝ yq “ μn`1 “
pn`1xRn`1 ` p1 ´ pn`1qxBn`1 “ pn`1maxtxRn`1, z ˝ yu ` p1 ´ pn`1qvn`1.
The three steps complete the proof.
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